Tag: Laiba Asad

Contributed by Laiba Asad

Introduction

On December 15, 2021, Canadian Blood Services (CBS), in a submission to Health Canada, recommended that the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men (MSM) be repealed. Currently, MSM can only donate blood if at least three months have passed since their last sexual encounter. In its proposal, the non-profit organization suggested that screening should instead be centered on high-risk behavior among all donors such as having numerous sexual partners. Health Canada, which regulates CBS, needs to respond to the recommendation before it can be implemented. This blog post will discuss the history of the ban and whether it is truly effective and necessary in protecting those who receive blood donations from contracting HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne sexually transmitted diseases. It will also examine the constitutionality of the ban and Health Canada’s role in eliminating it.

History of the ban

The history of the ban on blood donations from MSM dates back to the 1980s, when HIV and AIDS first appeared in Canada. Although not much was known about the virus at the time, it was clear that it disproportionately affected MSM, who constituted approximately 61% of AIDS cases. The lack of understanding of AIDS fueled fear, confusion, and prejudice against MSM. AIDS was called GRID (gay-related immune deficiency) before 1982, and at one point it was even known as the “4H disease,” a reference to the “hemophiliacs, heroin addicts, homosexuals, and Haitians” who were its predominant victims. Nevertheless, MSM were an important part of the blood donor pool and were much more supportive of blood drives compared to other groups. Therefore, the Canadian Red Cross Society (the predecessor to CBS) hesitated to ban them from donating blood when AIDS first emerged in Canada.

In 1985, in a public health crisis known as the Tainted Blood Scandal, over 2,000 Canadians contracted HIV and 30,000 contracted hepatitis C from blood products collected by the Canadian Red Cross Society, who failed to appropriately test and screen donors for blood viruses. Following the Tainted Blood Scandal, the Canadian Red Cross Society started testing all blood products for viruses like HIV and hepatitis C, and in 1992, introduced a lifetime ban on blood donations from MSM. Since blood transfusions remained urgent in saving lives and no cure existed for HIV/AIDS, the Canadian Red Cross Society deemed that testing blood products for viruses was insufficient to maintain the safety of the blood supply. Instead, banning high-risk groups of transmissible viral infections such as MSM from donating blood was seen as the only way to protect the blood supply.

In 2013, the policy was changed from a lifetime ban to a deferral period of five years by CBS. This meant that MSM had to remain abstinent for five years prior to donating blood. In 2016, the deferral period was reduced to one year, and, in 2019, it was further reduced to three months, which is the “window period” after infection during which CBS’s testing process is unable to detect HIV in blood.

Following the Tainted Blood Scandal, the Canadian Red Cross Society started testing all blood products for viruses like HIV and hepatitis C, and in 1992, introduced a lifetime ban on donations from MSM. || (Source: pixabay // Darwin Laganzon)

Is the ban necessary and effective?

CBS and Héma-Québec have long asserted that more research is needed to disprove the effectiveness of deferral periods for MSM. However, research has shown that the ban is unnecessary, ineffective in ensuring the adequacy of blood supply, and poorly targeted. For instance, documents obtained by Vice News in 2020 from Health Canada, CBS, and Héma-Québec, ranging from 2016 to 2018, show that screening is highly effective at detecting HIV in blood, with no cases of HIV infection from blood transfusion being reported in more than 25 years. Héma-Québec reported that seven donations tested positive for HIV from 2008 to 2015 and that screening caught the blood donation from each HIV-positive donor. Furthermore, the modification of the ban from a lifetime to five years to one year has had no substantial effect on transmissible disease rates. The documents demonstrated that the risk of contracting HIV from the blood donor system is one per 21.4 million units transfused — half as likely as hepatitis C and three times less likely than hepatitis B. Although MSM make up about half of all new HIV infections, moreover, Health Canada recognized that MSM are more likely to be aware of their HIV diagnosis compared to other risk groups and that people with diagnosed HIV infections are unlikely to donate blood.

Is the ban unconstitutional?

The ban on blood donations from MSM has attracted criticism from organisations and advocates who claim that CBS discriminates on the ground of sexual orientation, and thus infringes the right to equality under s.15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, on September 8, 2010, in the case of Freeman v. Canadian Blood Services (CBS) and the Attorney-General, the Ontario Superior Court rejected a claim that the CBS has been in violation of s.15 of the Charter by refusing blood donations from MSM since 1977. The case originated in 2002 when Kyle Freeman was sued by CBS for negligent misrepresentation and damages after he lied on the blood donor questionnaire in order to be eligible to donate blood, falsely stating that he had not had sexual relations with men since 1977. Freeman countersued CBS and Health Canada on the basis that the question violated s.15 of the Charter, pursuant to which he had the right to not be discriminated against based on sexual orientation. He asked that the Court order a change to the following question in the blood donor questionnaire: “Men have you had sex with another man, even once since 1977?.”

In the decision, Justice Aitken stated that in order to argue a violation of s.15(1), the claimant must demonstrate that “the unequal treatment complained of [involves] a benefit conferred by the law or a burden imposed by the law” [393]. However, in this case, Freeman failed to clearly indicate what benefit provided by law had been denied to him and granted to others or what burden imposed by law had been applied to him but not to others [400]. Justice Aitken recognized that giving blood procures benefits such as feeling connected to one’s community and increasing one’s sense of self-worth. She concluded, however, that there is no law or government policy that gives Canadians the right to donate blood or that has the underlying policy objective of conferring Canadians the benefits associated with giving blood [401]. Instead, she characterized blood donation as a gift that is freely offered and freely received or declined [403]. Furthermore, she found that Freeman hadn’t proven that that the distinction created by the MSM donor deferral policy was based on sexual orientation, explaining that the policy is based on health and safety considerations, namely, the higher rates of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne sexually transmitted diseases among MSM and the need to protect the safety of the country’s blood supply [452]. Finally, she wrote that donors have a duty to answer the blood donor questionnaire honestly and that the need for a lifetime ban wasn’t demonstrated.

The ban on blood donations from MSM has attracted criticism from organisations and advocates who claim that CBS discriminates on the ground of sexual orientation, and thus infringes the right to equality under s.15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. || (Source: pixabay // Michelle Gordon)

Health Canada’s role in eliminating the ban

Although the Ontario Superior Court’s decision in Freeman v. Canadian Blood Services (CBS) and the Attorney General upheld the CBS policy, questions about its constitutionality have continued to be raised at the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. For instance, in 2016, Christopher Karas brought a complaint against Health Canada to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, accusing Health Canada of discriminating against him on the basis of sexual orientation by upholding the CBS ban. Karas and his lawyers argued that while Health Canada doesn’t directly take blood donations, it grants regulatory approval to screening by CBS and therefore has a say in eliminating the ban. In 2019, the Canadian Human Rights Commission sent the complaint forward for inquiry to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of Health Canada, then sought a judicial review of the Commission’s decision at the Federal Court, stating that Health Canada has no role in the policy. Justice Southcott at the Federal Court dismissed the Attorney General’s request, asserting that Health Canada is a proper party to the case. The complaint is currently before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

Conclusion

If CBS’s long-awaited submission to Health Canada were to be approved, it would completely lift the ban on blood donations from MSM. Moreover, the current blood donor questionnaire, which is based on gender and sexuality, would be replaced by a lifestyle-based questionnaire, in which all donors are asked about the number of sexual partners or the frequency of unprotected sex they’ve had, in order to screen for potentially-infectious diseases. If this were to happen, Canada would follow other countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain where lifestyle-based questionnaires are used.

Laiba Asad is the Executive Online Editor of the McGill Journal of Law and Health. She is in her second year of the BCL/JD program at McGill University’s Faculty of Law. Prior to beginning law school, she completed her DEC in Health Science (IB) at Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf. 

Contributed by Laiba Asad

Introduction

Medical assistance in dying has long been debated in Canada. The recent amendments made to Canada’s medical assistance in dying (MAID) regime on March 17, 2021 have been met with varying opinions. This blog post will discuss the original MAID legislation, the Superior Court of Québec’s decision in Truchon v. Attorney General of Canada which challenged this legislation and subsequent amendments made to MAID legislation. Finally, it will discuss how these amendments have been received by various groups.

The Original Medical Assistance in Dying Legislation

With the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Carter v Canada (2015), provisions in the Criminal Code prohibiting medical assistance in dying (paragraph 241(b) and section 14) were ruled to be unconstitutional under s.7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees life, liberty, and security of the person. As a result, in June 2016, the Parliament of Canada passed federal legislation – the Medical Assistance in Dying Act (MAID Act) – allowing eligible Canadian adults to access medical assistance in dying. MAID legislation allowed for two legal medical practices as seen in section 241.1 of the Criminal Code: administration of a substance directly by a physician or a nurse practitioner that causes death of a patient and prescription of a substance by a physician or a nurse practitioner that can be self-administered by the patient.

This new legislative scheme imposed restrictive eligibility requirements for people requesting MAID. They needed to:

• be eligible for government funded health services in Canada,
• be at least 18 years old with the capacity of making decisions concerning their health,
• have a grievous and irremediable medical condition (serious and incurable illness) with their natural death being reasonably foreseeable,
• have made a voluntary request for MAID free of any external pressure, and
• give informed consent to receive MAID after having been presented with all the necessary information, such as means available to relieve their suffering (palliative care), forms of treatment, among others.

Additionally, MAID legislation was further restricted by procedural safeguards including:

• checking that people requesting MAID are aware that they can withdraw their request at any time,
• making sure that two medical professionals confirm through written opinions that the individual in question fulfils all eligibility requirements, and
• ensuring that final consent is given before MAID is administered.

Truchon v. Attorney General of Canada (2019) and amendments to MAID law

Soon after coming into effect, eligibility criteria in the MAID Act were challenged on the basis that they were unconstitutional. In September 2019, the applicants in Truchon v. Attorney General of Canada, Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu, took issue with the validity of s.241.2(d) of the MAID Act and s.26(3) of Quebec’s Act Respecting End of Life Care. Truchon, who had cerebral palsy and Gladu who had post-polio syndrome, claimed that the provisions, which had prevented them from accessing MAID, were too restrictive. The applicants argued that the requirement under s. 241.2(d) of the MAID Act that their “natural death must be reasonably foreseeable” violated principles set out in the Charter, as well as s.7 (rights to life, liberty, and security) and s.15 (right to equality) of the Charter.

At the Superior Court of Québec, Justice Baudouin concluded that the requirement that “natural death must be reasonably foreseeable” infringed on the applicants’ right to life under s.7 of the Charter seeing that it “exposes individuals such as Mr. Truchon and Ms. Gladu, to a heightened risk of death” [522]. She goes on to explain how the requirement also violates their rights to liberty and security under s.7 of the Charter because it “directly interferes with their physical integrity, causes them physical and psychological pain and deprives them of the opportunity to make a fundamental decision that respects their personal dignity and integrity” [534]. As for s.15 of the Charter, Justice Baudouin concluded that the requirement violated the applicants’ right to equality since it created a distinction based on the nature of a disability (cerebral palsy and post-polio syndrome) which sustained disadvantage and prejudice for them. She further stated that this infringement of rights was not justified since the restriction imposed by the requirement of reasonable foreseeability of death had damaging effects on people in similar situations to the applicants, which were disproportionate to the benefits of the requirement. Finally, Justice Baudouin concluded that s.241.2(d) of the MAID Act was overly broad and disproportionate to its object of protecting people from ending their life in a moment of vulnerability, thus making it incompatible with the principles of fundamental justice.

Even though the declaration of invalidity in Truchon is only applicable in Quebec, the federal government decided to respond to the court’s decision by bringing amendments to the MAID Act. Consequently, in February 2020, Bill C-7 : An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Medical Assistance in Dying) was presented in Parliament. After having received royal assent, Bill C-7 became law on March 17, 2021.

The new medical assistance in dying legislation

The changes made to Canada’s MAID legislation reflect the decision in Truchon, meaning that the legislation presently expands MAID to those whose deaths are not reasonably foreseeable, potentially expanding the class of people now eligible for MAID. People whose deaths are reasonably foreseeable are still eligible for MAID, while the other eligibility criteria from the original legislation remain. 

The amended law provides for two approaches to procedural safeguards depending on whether the individual’s death is reasonably foreseeable or not. For those whose death is reasonably foreseeable, additional and strengthened safeguards have been put in place such as eligibility assessments that must take at least 90 days unless the individual is losing their capacity to make decisions relating to their health. On the other hand, those whose death is reasonably foreseeable are subject to eased and existing safeguards in that final consent is no longer required or can be waived in certain circumstances before the administration of MAID for example.

With the original MAID legislation, requests for MAID solely on the basis of mental disorder generally didn’t fulfil the reasonable foreseeability of death requirement. However, since this requirement is now repealed, the new MAID legislation will also enable individuals to request MAID solely on the basis of a mental disorder. This will come into effect in two years. During these two years governments and medical bodies are expected to decide on guidelines and safeguards regarding these requests.

The new MAID legislation will also enable individuals to request MAID solely on the basis of a mental disorder.|| (Source: pixabay // Tumisu/1028 images)

How the new MAID legislation has been received

The possibility that MAID might be available to individuals solely on the basis of mental disorder remains a contentious topic among psychiatrists, with many doubting whether MAID in that context can ever be carried out safely. Some have contended that MAID for individuals with mental disorders would only be limited to a small number of people such as those who have had prolonged mental illness and have received various treatments. Others have said that since prognosis of mental illness is always unsure, the focus should be on psychiatric palliative care for severe cases instead. Advocates from Canada’s Black and Indigenous communities have also argued that the possibility of requesting MAID solely on the basis of a mental disorder could put vulnerable people at risk. For instance,  Indigenous people  often live in conditions linked to higher rates of mental illness and suicide and often don’t feel safe requesting medical services due to stigma and discrimination. Advocates would rather the federal government tackle anti-Indigenous and anti-black racism in the healthcare system before expanding MAID. 

Furthermore, many have argued that the new MAID legislation will particularly affect people with disabilities. For instance, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities contends that the bill will push people with disabilities towards MAID since there is a continued lack of appropriate support and services available to them. On the other hand, the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers emphasizes that medical professionals take great care in assessing the vulnerability of an individual requesting MAID.

The possibility that MAID might be available to individuals solely on the basis of mental disorder remains a contentious topic among psychiatrists, with many doubting whether MAID in that context can ever be carried out safely.|| (Source: pixabay // Bru-nO/5419 images)

Conclusion

The new MAID legislation expands the class of people who can now access MAID by removing the reasonable foreseeability of death requirement, making it so that individuals can request MAID solely on the basis of mental disorder. It remains to be seen if advance requests for MAID – where a competent person makes a request for MAID that could be honoured in the future after they lose their capacity to make their own medical decisions – will be accepted as part of Canada’s MAID regime in the future.

Laiba Asad is a Junior Online Editor with the McGill Journal of Law and Health. She is in her first year of the BCL/JD program at McGill University’s Faculty of Law. Prior to beginning law school, she completed her DEC in Health Science (IB) at Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf. 

Contribué par Laiba Asad

Introduction

Le 26 octobre 2020 le Sénat américain confirme Amy Coney Barrett à la Cour suprême. Elle est une fervente catholique et grande admiratrice d’Antonin Scalia, un ancien juge conservateur de la Cour suprême. Barrett a mentionné lors de son audition qu’elle ne considère pas Roe v Wade comme un « super précédent », c’est-à-dire une décision qui ne peut pas être renversée à toute fin pratique. Ainsi, avec dix-sept dossiers sur l’avortement qui sont près d’être entendus par la Cour suprême et une majorité conservatrice qui y siège, il est possible que Roe v. Wade soit renversé ou affaibli dans l’avenir.

Ainsi, avec dix-sept dossiers sur l’avortement qui sont près d’être entendus par la Cour suprême et une majorité conservatrice qui y siège, il est possible que Roe v. Wade soit renversé ou affaibli dans l’avenir.|| (Source : creativecommons // zacklur)

Les lois sur l’avortement avant Roe v. Wade

L’avortement était légal aux États-Unis jusqu’en 1821, s’il était performé avant le mouvement fœtal. En 1821, le Connecticut passe la première loi criminalisant l’avortement, et vers la fin du 19^ème siècle, les autres l’États l’interdisent également. Dans les années 1950, un changement survient lorsqu’un groupe de professionnels, formé principalement d’avocats, de médecins et de membres du clergé, commencent à s’interroger sur l’interdiction à l’avortement. Vers les années 1960, les débats sur l’avortement s’intensifient considérablement et impliquent des préoccupations à propos de la pauvreté, la liberté sexuelle et le féminisme, entre autres. Ils encouragent les États à élaborer des mesures législatives afin de permettre aux femmes d’avoir accès à l’avortement sous certaines circonstances. Vers les années 1970, vingt États mettent en place des lois pour reformer leurs lois sur l’avortement existantes alors que quatre États (New York, Washington, Alaska et Hawaii) légalisent l’avortement. Les autres États interdisent l’avortement dans presque toutes les circonstances.

Roe v. Wade et son impact sur le droit à l’avortement et d’autres lois sur l’avortement aux États-Unis

L’affaire Roe v. Wade (1973) concerne Jane Roe, une femme au Texas qui disait être tombée enceinte après avoir été victime d’un viol collectif. La loi sur l’avortement au Texas permettait l’avortement seulement si la vie de la femme était en danger. Ainsi, Jane Roe décide de poursuivre l’État du Texas, et en 1970, elle dépose un recours collectif à la Cour de district fédéral de Dallas. La Cour conclue que la loi sur l’avortement du Texas était inconstitutionnellement vague et brimait le droit des femmes à la liberté reproductive. L’État du Texas va en appel à la Cour suprême, ce qui mène à l’arrêt Roe v. Wade.

En 1973, la Cour suprême a trouvé la loi sur l’avortement du Texas inconstitutionnelle pour deux raisons principales. Premièrement, cette loi interdisait le droit à la vie privée aux femmes – une liberté fondamentale protégée par le 14^ème amendement de la Constitution. Ainsi, le droit à l’avortement, compris dans le droit à la vie privée, est protégé par la Constitution. Deuxièmement, cette loi interdisait l’avortement à une exception près sous le prétexte que le fœtus était considéré comme une personne sous le 14^ème amendement de la Constitution. Cependant, la Cour établit que le fœtus n’est pas reconnu comme une personne par la loi et par conséquent ne peut pas être protégé par la Constitution.

L’arrêt Roe v. Wade précise que les États doivent permettre l’avortement non seulement dans les cas de viol, mais tous les cas. En établissant le droit à l’avortement, qui est maintenant protégé par la Constitution, il a légalisé l’avortement partout aux États-Unis et chaque État doit avoir au moins une clinique d’avortement.

Le droit à l’avortement et l’accès aux soins de santé aux États-Unis

La décision de Roe v. Wade affirme que le droit à l’avortement est constitutionnel, elle intègre également l’accès aux soins de santé à ce droit. Cependant, l’accès à l’avortement comme soin médical a été limité notamment par des restrictions quant aux procédures d’avortement permises. Par exemple, dans l’affaire Gonzales v Carhart, la Cour suprême soutient l’interdiction fédérale d’une procédure d’avortement nommée l’avortement par naissance partielle. Avec des restrictions de ce type, les médecins ne peuvent pas toujours offrir les meilleures procédures d’avortement à leurs patientes.

De plus, malgré Roe v. Wade, des restrictions sur l’avortement ont été mises en place dans plusieurs États. Que ce soient exiger les cliniques à répondre à des normes similaires à celles imposées dans les hôpitaux ou limiter la couverture d’assurances pour les avortements, ces restrictions ont un impact important sur l’accès à l’avortement. Elles font que certaines régions américaines sont laissées avec peu ou aucune clinique d’avortement, ce qui rend l’accès à l’avortement très difficile, surtout pour les femmes qui se trouvent loin de ces cliniques.

Il existe aussi des règlements dans les États régissant l’information concernant l’avortement à laquelle les femmes ont accès. En Oklahoma, la législation requiert que les patientes aient une échographie et permet aux médecins de ne pas divulguer l’information quant aux anomalies fœtales aux patientes. Cette législation force les patientes à avoir de l’information qu’elles ne désiraient pas nécessairement avoir, et les prive d’informations qui pourraient avoir un impact sur leur décision d’avoir un avortement ou pas.

Sous certaines lois fédérales et étatiques avec des « clauses de conscience », des institutions et des individus peuvent refuser d’offrir l’avortement et d’autres soins médicaux à des patientes. Il existe aussi des lois étatiques restreignant l’accès à des médicaments pour l’avortement.

Il existe des règlements dans les États pouvant limiter l’information sur l’avortement à laquelle les femmes ont accès.|| (Source : creativecommons // ConwayStrategic)

Effets du renversement ou de l’affaiblissement de Roe v. Wade à l’accès à l’avortement dans les États

Le renversement ou l’affaiblissement de Roe v. Wade ne signifierait pas que l’avortement devient automatiquement illégal aux États-Unis. Il aurait plutôt comme effet de laisser les États décider du droit à l’avortement. Selon des recherches de Middlebury College (2019), dans plus de la moitié des États, y compris l’ouest et le nord-est du pays, l’avortement serait encore accessible sans Roe v. Wade. Toutefois, ça ne serait pas la même situation dans d’autres États puisque ces recherches ont également trouvé que le taux d’avortement pourrait diminuer de 13% dans le pays avec le renversement de Roe v. Wade.

En 2019, l’Alabama, l’Arkansas, la Géorgie, le Kentucky, le Missouri et l’Ohio, entre autres ont passé des lois interdisant l’avortement, mais les tribunaux les ont invalidées avant qu’elles n’aient  pu prendre effet. Selon des experts légaux, ces États qui ont déjà passé des « trigger law » (des lois qui peuvent devenir opérantes avec un changement de législation), interdiraient l’avortement immédiatement après le renversement de Roe v. Wade. Treize autres États interdiraient probablement l’avortement également. Dans ces États généralement, il n’y a qu’une seule clinique d’avortement ; Roe v. Wade étant la seule chose qui y rend le droit à l’avortement légal parce qu’il n’est pas protégé par des lois étatiques, ni la constitution de l’État. Ainsi, avec le renversement de Roe v. Wade, la seule clinique d’avortement disponible dans ces États pourrait fermer ses portes. Il serait tout de même possible pour les femmes de se déplacer à des États voisins, ce qui peut être difficile pour plusieurs, comme les femmes à faible revenu. Celles qui ne peuvent pas se déplacer à une clinique pour des raisons diverses seraient généralement les plus affectées par l’interdiction du droit à l’avortement. Si elles n’arrivaient pas à se rendre à une clinique d’avortement, ces femmes pourraient chercher des alternatives comme des pilules abortives procurées clandestinement d’autres États, ou encore des procédures illégales et moins sécuritaires d’avortement.

Effets du renversement ou de l’affaiblissement de Roe v. Wade sur le Canada

En 1988, avec l’affaire R v. Morgentaler, la Cour suprême du Canada conclut que, la disposition 251 du Code criminel qui criminalisait l’avortement est inconstitutionnelle en vertu de l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. L’article 7 accorde le droit à la liberté, ce qui comprend l’autonomie des femmes dans les choix touchant leurs vies privées. Cette affaire décriminalise l’avortement partout au Canada et devient un précédent important qui n’a pas été changé depuis 1988.  

Il n’y a donc pas de loi sur l’avortement au Canada étant donné qu’il a été décriminalisé. Il est considéré comme étant une procédure médicale, dont l’accès est contrôlé par les provinces. Étant donné que le droit criminel est une compétence fédérale, les provinces n’ont pas les mêmes capacités que les États américains. De plus, au Canada, le débat sur l’avortement n’est pas abordé par les dirigeants fédéraux et provinciaux, contrairement aux États-Unis où ce débat est ranimé constamment. Il est donc improbable que l’avortement serait criminalisé au Canada si Roe v. Wade est renversé. Toutefois, il est indéniable que le mouvement pro-vie américain affecte le mouvement pro-vie au Canada.

Une préoccupation au Canada est l’accès à l’avortement. L’accès est souvent mieux dans les milieux urbains par rapport aux milieux ruraux. Dans les milieux ruraux, plusieurs services de santé n’offrent pas l’avortement ou n’offrent que certaines procédures comme l’avortement chirurgical. Certaines femmes canadiennes qui vont aux États-Unis, dans les États de Washington, Colorado et Nouveau-Mexique par exemple, pour se procurer des services d’avortement. Toutefois, si Roe v. Wade est renversé, ces femmes canadiennes auront plus de difficulté à accéder à ces services aux États-Unis parce que les lois étatiques sur l’avortement changeraient.

Conclusion

Roe v. Wade est une décision historique de la Cour suprême qui a légalisé l’avortement aux États-Unis. Malgré cette légalisation, l’accès à l’avortement reste un enjeu important. Le problème d’accès à l’avortement s’aggraverait probablement si Roe v. Wade est affaibli ou renversé par la Cour suprême puisque ceci donnerait aux États le pouvoir de légiférer leurs propres lois sur l’avortement.

Laiba Asad est une rédactrice junior en ligne pour la Revue de droit et de santé de McGill et étudiante en première année de BCL/JD à la Faculté de droit de l’Université McGill. Avant de rentrer à la faculté de droit, elle a obtenu son DEC en sciences de la santé (BI) du Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf.